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Abstract
Many decisions are made by voting. At first glance, the more people
participate in the voting process, the more democratic – and hence, better
– the decision. In this spirit, to encourage everyone’s participation, several
countries make voting mandatory. But does mandatory voting really make
decisions better for the society? In this paper, we show that from the
viewpoint of decision making theory, it is better to allow undecided voters
not to participate in the voting process. We also show that the voting
process would be even better – for the society as a whole – if we allow
partial votes. This provides a solid justification for a semi-heuristic “fuzzy
voting” scheme advocated by Bart Kosko.

Need for democratic decision making. Often, a social entity faces a problem, and there are several alternative ways to solve this problem. For example,
to build a new baseball stadium, the city can either use the existing funds or
issue a bond – and hope that the future proﬁts from this stadium will pay oﬀ
this bond. In many such cases, the decision is made by voting: the choice is
placed on a ballot, and the solution is decided by a majority vote.
Voting is beneﬁcial not only in the social life: there is a body of research
showing that students perform better in a democratic classroom, where they are
actively involved in day-by-day pedagogical decisions; see, e.g., [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
Which form of democratic decision making is the best? Does the democratic process always leads to a solution which is the best for the population?
No doubt, democracy is better than tyranny, and a decision made with people’s
participation is better than a decision made by the rulers without the people’s
input, but democracy can mean many diﬀerent things, and it is not a priori
clear which form of democratic decision making is the best.
For example, some countries (like Australia) force its citizens to vote, imposing ﬁnes and other penalties for not voting, while in the US, voting is voluntary.
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As a result, in Australia, close to 100% of the registered voters vote, while in
the US, even in important elections, about 60% of the voters come to the poll.
Does it mean that Australian solutions are more democratic and thus lead to
better results?
Our approach. People have been passionately arguing about these issues for
a long time, but these arguments are usually on the imprecise level, a level
at which it is diﬃcult to convince each other and come up with a mutually
agreeable solution. To generate such a solution, let us analyze this problem
from the precise economic viewpoint – namely, from the viewpoint of decision
theory; see, e.g., [1, 10, 13].
In this paper, we only consider situations in which each of the proposed solutions is better than status quo. In our analysis, we only consider situations in which each of the proposed solutions is better than status
quo.
A good example if when a country is in an economic crisis, on the verge of
bankruptcy; in this case, most proposed solutions are better for everyone than
the current situation.
What decision theory tells us about such situations. Decision theory
has thoroughly analyzed diﬀerent decision making situations. To apply decision
theory to such a situation, we need to know, for each participant i and for each
proposed solution a, the utility ui (a) of this solution a to the participant i.
Utility describes preferences in the sense that the larger the utility, the more
preferable is an alternative. In these terms, our assumption that for each participant i, each proposed solution a is better than the status quo situation a0
means that ui (a) > ui (a0 ) for all a and i.
Once we know these utility values ui (a), we can characterize each alternative
a by a vector u(a) = (u1 (a), . . . , un (a)). Collective decision-making means that
we need to be able to meaningfully compare every two alternatives a and b:
based on the vectors u(a) and u(b), we need to decide which of the alternatives
a and b is better. In mathematical terms, we need to deﬁne a total (linear)
order on the set of all the vectors u = (u1 , . . . , un ) for which ui > ui (a0 ) for all
i.
It is known that the utility values are not absolute, they are deﬁned modulo
a linear transformation ui → ki · u + ℓi , for constants ki > 0 and ℓ. In our voting
situation, we have a ﬁxed alternative – the status quo state a0 . For simplicity,
it is therefore reasonable, by selecting an appropriate value ℓi , to make the i-th
utility of the status quo solution a0 equal to 0. Thus, without losing generality,
we can assume that ui (a0 ) = 0 for all participants i. Under this additional
assumption, the above restriction on utility values take a simple form ui > 0
for all i, and the only remaining non-uniqueness in deﬁning utility is re-scaling
ui → ki · ui .
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It is reasonable to require that the resulting order between the vectors u and
v do not change if we simply re-scale the utilities. In other words, if originally,
we had u = (u1 , . . . , un ) > v = (v1 , . . . , vn ), and we apply a re-scaling to each
of the utility scales, then after the re-scaling, we should have
(k1 · u1 , . . . , kn · un ) > (k1 · v1 , . . . , kn · vn ).
It is also reasonable to require that all people are equal, i.e., that the order
does not change if we simply swap two or more participants. In precise terms,
if π : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} is a permutation, then (u1 , . . . , un ) > (v1 , . . . , vn )
should imply (uπ(1) , . . . , uπ(n) ) > (vπ(1) , . . . , vπ(n) ).
It is known that these reasonable conditions uniquely determine the desired
ordering between the alternatives: namely, we should select the alternative a
n
∏
for which the product
ui (a) attains the largest possible value. This result
i=1

was ﬁrst obtained by the Nobelist John Nash [11], and it is known as Nash’s
bargaining solution.
Let us apply decision theory solution to this voting situation. From
the mathematical viewpoint, maximizing the product is the same as maximizing
its logarithm. So, the recommendation of the decision theory is to select an
n
∑
alternative a for which the sum
ℓi (a) attains the largest possible value, where
i=1
def

ℓi (a) = ln(ui (a)).
In particular, if we only have two alternatives a1 ad a2 , then we select a1 if
n
n
n
∑
∑
∑
and only if
ℓi (a1 ) ≥
ℓi (a2 ), i.e., if and only if
∆i > 0, where
i=1

i=1

i=1

(
def

∆i = ℓi (a1 ) − ℓi (a2 ) = ln
How is this related to voting.

ui (a1 )
ui (a2 )

)
.

In the above sum:

• participants who prefer
a1)
, i.e., for whom ui (a1 ) > ui (a2 ), enter with a
(
ui (a1 )
positive weight ln
> 0, and
ui (a2 )
• participants who prefer
a2 ,)i.e., for whom ui (a1 ) < ui (a2 ), enter with a
(
ui (a1 )
negative weight ln
< 0.
ui (a2 )
In this sense, the solution is similar to voting:
• if the overwhelming majority of people prefer a1 , we select a1 , and
• if the overwhelming majority of people prefer a2 , we select a2 .
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However, this is not exactly the usual voting, because in the Nash’s bargaining
solution, diﬀerent weights are assigned to diﬀerent participants.
To better understand the diﬀerence between Nash’s solution and the usual
voting, let us re-scale the preferences of each of the participant in such a way that
the largest value of his or her utility becomes equal to 1. Let us ﬁrst consider
a simpliﬁed situation in which each participants assigns utility 1 to his or her
preferred alternative and some positive value u0 < 1 to another alternative. In
this case, for participants who prefer a1 , we have u(a1 ) = 1, u(a2 ) = u0 , and
thus,
(
)
ui (a1 )
∆i = ln
= | ln(u0 )|.
ui (a2 )
For participants who prefer a2 , we have u(a1 ) = u0 , u(a2 ) = 1, and thus,
(
)
ui (a1 )
∆i = ln
= −| ln(u0 )|.
ui (a2 )
Thus, the sum

n
∑

∆i is equal to | ln(u0 )| times the number of participants who

i=1

prefer a1 minus the number of participants who prefer a2 . In this simpliﬁed
situation:
• we select a1 if the majority prefers a1 , and
• we select a2 is the majority selects a2 .
In other words, in this simplest case, Nash’s equilibrium solution coincide with
the usual voting.
In general, however, this is not the case: undecided participants, for whom
ui (a1 ) ≈ ui (a2 ), inﬂuence the Nash’s bargaining solution much less than those
for whom ui (a1 ) ≫ ui (a2 ) or ui (a2 ) ≫ ui (a1 ).
Conclusion. A US-type system, where undecided people are allowed not to
vote, is closer to the optimal solution than a system in which everyone is forced
to vote. In eﬀect, forcing everyone to vote make undecided people vote at
random, adding a confusing random noise to the voting results.
An even better voting system would be to take into account utilities – and
thus, degrees of indecision. Such a “fuzzy voting” system has been actively
promoted – on a heuristic basis – by B. Kosko; see, e.g., [9] (see also [12]).
What we show is that such a system naturally follows from the general ideas of
decision making theory.
Comment. There is an even better approach: to make people accept measures
that may hurt them in the short run, people who advocate these measures provide additional compensations to those who may be hurt: e.g., an increase in
a university tuition is usually compensated by increasing stipends and loans
available to students who cannot aﬀord such increases. At present, such compensation is provided on a heuristic basis. Ideally, the amount of compensation
should also be decided based on Nash’s bargaining solution.
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